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DONALD REGAN 
COMMENTS ON PARF IT  
I will begin by saying that I am persuaded by most of Derek's claims 
and arguments. That may tend to make for rather uninteresting 
commentary, but I shall try to find something to say. I shall offer only 
one criticism of the main part of Derek's paper, and then I shall 
discuss at somewhat greater length the questions he raises in the last 
section of his paper. 
In the main body of the paper, Derek attempts to prove that if we 
accept what he calls the Complex View of personal identity, then we 
must abandon what he calls the Equal Concern Claim of Classical 
Prudence. The basic argument is simple. On the Complex View, 
personal identity is a matter of degree. But it is not irrational to think 
that a fact which is a matter of degree is of lesser importance when it 
holds to a lesser degree. Therefore, it is not irrational to think that 
one's identity with oneself in the distant future may be of lesser 
importance than one's identity with oneself in the near future. It 
follows that it is not irrational to give greater weight o one's interests 
in the near future. Classical Prudence is not a requirement of 
rationality. 
My only criticism of this argument may seem, and indeed may be, 
niggling. Derek relies on the claim that on the Complex View identity is a 
matter of degree. But is it, necessarily? The Complex View is defined 
primarily by contrast to the Simple View. Derek also says that on the 
Complex View, "the fact of personal identity over time just consists in 
the holding of certain other facts," such as various kinds of psy- 
chological continuity. Now suppose someone says, "Personal identity 
consists imply in continuity of physical and psychological development 
- nothing else. That is, we look at one person-at-a-time and another 
person-at-a-different-time; if the person-at-the-later-time developed by 
a continuous, non-disrupted process from the person-at-the-earlier- 
time, then the two are in fact the same person." I shall call this view the 
Developmental View. It seems to me that the Developmental View is a 
Complex View, in Derek's terms, but a Complex View on which 
personal identity is not a matter of degree. 
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Derek overlooks the Developmental View because he tends to 
equivocate, both when he uses the word "continuity" and when he 
uses the word "connected," between two ideas that naturally go 
together. One of these is roughly the idea of a development from one 
state to another without "jumps"; and the other is the idea of 
resemblance of the end points of the development. Resemblance of 
the end points, which Derek concentrates on, is certainly a matter of 
degree. But one could say that all that matters to personal identity is 
development without jumps. Then one has the Developmental View, 
and a Complex View on which personal identity is an all-or-nothing 
matter. 
Derek might protest that even continuity of development is a 
matter of degree. What disrupts continuity of development? Well, 
things like brain-washing, or extremely intrusive electric shock 
therapy. These constitute "jumps" in development. But then, Derek 
might observe, brain-washing and electric shock therapy come in 
degrees. If identity depends on the absence o f  jumps, and if the things 
which can constitute jumps come in degrees, then identity will turn 
out to be a matter of degree after all. 
This is a good point, but not good enough. I concede that it makes 
personal identity a matter of degree in some cases, for example, in the 
cases of people subjected to brainwashing of "borderline" intensity 
or disruptiveness. But the vast majority of people are not subjected to 
brainwashing, or electric shock therapy, or anything else that a 
proponent of the Developmental View would have to recognize as 
potentially disrupting continuity of development, in any degree at all. 
With respect o the vast majority of people, on the Developmental 
View, no question of degree ever arises, and Derek has no argument 
against he Equal Concern Claim. (I simply note, without explaining, 
that what I am saying here is different, despite some superficial 
similarity, from Derek's point that even on his view the reSemblances 
of people to themselves over all actual lives are probably great 
enough so that it would never be irrational to care equally about all 
parts of one's future.) 
Derek might now complain that the Developmental View is 
extremely implausible. If we abandon the Simple View and look for 
the fact of personal identity among "natural" facts, then surely 
resemblance of the end points of development must count for some- 
thing. On the issue of plausibility, I would agree. The Developmental 
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View is implausible, and I suspect hat anyone who held it would be 
engaged in rationalization, trying to hold the Simple View in effect 
without having to defend it. Still, the existence of the Developmental 
View reveals a gap in Derek's logical argument. 
Everything else I shall have to say is about the last section of 
Derek's paper. If Classical Prudence is defeated - and despite my 
carping I agree with Derek that it is - we are left with the issue of 
how to justify a kind of criticism we are strongly disposed to make, 
namely criticism of an agent for showing insufficient concern for his 
own future interests. Derek suggests that if we cannot base our 
criticism on an appeal to rationality, then morality must step in to fill 
the gap. He makes no attempt o conceal the fact that this suggestion 
is in one respect highly counterintuitive. We are accustomed to think 
of morality as imposing restrictions on an agent for the protection of 
others. To the extent that we have traditionally recognized self- 
regarding moral duties, they have been duties of perfection - duties to 
cultivate one's talents or to preserve one's purity, to use Derek's 
examples. We have not generally thought of morality as the source of 
a duty to look out for one's own general future happiness. But that is 
what Derek proposes. 
We could avoid this counter-intuitive aspect of Derek's appeal to 
morality if we were willing to say that the agent's future selves are 
"different persons" from the present agent. Then the appeal to 
morality would be on behalf of "others." Derek does not take this 
line. Indeed, there is a passage in his paper where it seems he is 
taking particular care not to be trapped into it. After his discussion of 
the propositions that not all relatives are equally close and that not all 
pains are equally painful, there is a point at which it would be very 
natural for him to say that not all of my interests are equally mine 
(and specifically that my future interests are less mine than my 
present interests). Derek refuses to say that my future interests are 
less mine. One reason, I suspect, is that if he said my future interests 
were not in the fullest sense mine, it would invite the question of 
whose exactly they are. They are ordinary, full-fledged, human inter- 
ests. They must be fully somebody's. If not mine, then whose? To 
which the obvious answer would be that the interests in question 
belong fully to my "future self" (or to one of my future selves), 
regarded as somebody different from me. 
Unlike Derek, I am inclined to take the view that my future selves 
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are different persons from my present self. Admittedly, this view has 
its own difficulties and its own counter-intuitive aspect. In ordinary 
discourse, we speak as if one physical body is occupied by one 
person throughout that body's physical ife. We speak as if we have 
no doubt that Donald Regan fifty years hence, if I live so long, will 
still be me.  We certainly do not believe in general that a change in 
something always constitutes a change in identity. We do not believe 
that about ships or nations. Furthermore, if we take seriously the idea 
that the agent in the future may be a different person from the person 
he is at present, then we encounter severe problems about deciding 
just exactly when he becomes another person. How do we separate 
the time-extended agent into the different persons that he is over his 
physical life? 
Both Derek's suggestion and mine, then, are problematic. This is 
not the place for a full-scale attempt o arbitrate between them. It 
seems to me that Derek resists tampering with the normal extension 
of "self" and "other," but that in consequence h  is driven to deprive 
the distinction between self and other of a good deal of its normal 
moral force. In the long run, whether we prefer my view or Derek's 
may depend on the extent o which our interest in personal identity is 
motivated primarily by moral, as opposed to metaphysical, concerns. 
In the short run, so long as we agree on cases, as Derek and I mostly 
do, it may not matter too much what we say. (In the remainder of 
these comments, I shall presuppose Derek's view that myself in the 
future is still "me.") 
All of this raises the question whether there is a way to analyze the 
case of the agent who slights his own future interests which ought to 
be preferred to both Derek's view and mine. Someone might say: "In 
the case of an agent who slights his own future interests, there is no 
basis for moral criticism because he hurts no one else. There is no 
basis for an accusation of irrationality, as Derek has shown. There- 
fore, there is no basis for any criticism at all. If we have an impulse to 
criticize, we should rather look to ourselves and suppress the im- 
pulse." (This argument depends on an implicit premise that if there is 
no basis for saying the agent is either immoral or irrational then there 
is no basis for criticism. This implicit premise is plainly Derek's, to 
the extent he assumes morality must fill the space prudence vacates.) 
The claim that there is no basis for criticism could be made somewhat 
plausible, but I think it is ultimately indefensible. I shall not here 
attempt either to build it up or to tear it down. I only note that the 
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question presently at issue is not whether we should coerce people to 
look out for their own future interests. It is only the question whether 
there is a basis for criticism when people do not. The common view, 
and Derek's view and mine, is that some sort of criticism is surely 
appropriate. 
Consider another possible reaction to Derek's argument: "Derek 
has shown that if we accept he Complex View of personal identity, 
then the person who slights his own future interests is not irrational. 
He is also not immoral, since no one else is harmed. Therefore his 
behavior is unexceptionable. But that is absurd. We know he is 
behaving badly somehow. Obviously what Derek has given us is a 
reductio ad absurdum of the Complex View." This reaction may 
seem out of bounds. Derek does not purport o argue for the Complex 
View in his paper. He takes it for granted, assuming that it can be 
justified by arguments he does not here expound. However, the 
reaction I have described is not entirely inappropriate. It reminds us 
that we should not attempt to choose between the Simple View and 
the Complex View of personal identity on metaphysical grounds 
alone. One factor in the choice is the alternatives the two views allow 
us for accounting for our "practical" (moral and prudential) in- 
tuitions. If the Complex View creates difficulties on this score which 
the Simple View avoids, that counts against the Complex View 
(without necessarily being decisive). 
I just said, "If the Complex View creates difficulties on this score 
which the Simple View avoids . . . .  " That raises a question about the 
Simple View which I hope will justify one paragraph of out-and-out 
digression. Derek assumes, as most people do, that the Simple View 
fits easily with Classical Prudence and the Equal Concern Claim; but 
there is a difficulty even here. The Simple View naturally leads us to 
think of the self as an entity somehow outside time. It is because the 
self is essential]y timeless that it should be neutral among its tem- 
porally-distinct interests. Consider this however: If the self is essen- 
tially timeless, and if it is that timeless elf that makes the choices 
that are manifested in the temporal world, how could an agent 
possibly fail to be temporally neutral? We assume that people 
frequently fail to be temporally neutral, that people have an in- 
clination to over-value their present interests. But the timeless elf of 
the Simple View could have no motive for such a time-preference. If 
we truly believed in the Simple View, then should we not assume that 
in any case where an agent appears to us to be temporally biased, the 
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reason is that we have misperceived the agent's true interests? (Of 
course, even the timeless self might exhibit an apparent ime-pref- 
erence because of factual mistake, or uncertainty about the future, or 
the like. I am concerned with apparent time-preference which remains 
after such factors have been accounted for.) The tension I am 
pointing out is not really between the Simple View and Classical 
Prudence; it is between the Simple View and our impulse to crit icize 
some behavior as classically imprudent. If we believe not only in the 
rightness of Classical Prudence, but also in the rightness of our 
criticisms on the ground of imprudence, then there is some reason to 
doubt that we can hold the Simple View after all. (I say "some 
reason" because this paragraph obviously raises issues much too 
complex for full discussion here.) 
Let me now say just a few words about Derek's final question: If 
the agent who slights his own future interests is thought to behave 
immorally instead of imprudently or irrationally, does that strengthen 
or weaken the case for paternalistic intervention? Intuitively, it seems 
as if it might strengthen it, and I think we can produce a sort of an 
argument o that effect. We have inclinations both to coerce short- 
sighted agents to behave prudently and to coerce selfish agents to 
behave morally. But prudence and morality may conflict. In cases of 
conflict, if we engage in coercion at all, we will compel the behavior 
which is moral but imprudent. We are not at all inclined to compel the 
behavior which is prudent but immoral. That suggests that morality is 
in some relevant sense stronger than prudence, so that if we shift 
from prudence to morality as the basis for protecting the agent's own 
future interests, we are now appealing to a stronger basis for inter- 
vention. 
I am not sure the argument just given is very helpful. The problem 
is that it assumes niorality in its new role of protecting the agent's 
future interests has the same force as morality in its old role of 
protecting other agents. It is not at all clear, however, that morality in 
its new role does have the same force. If we pose the question as one 
of institutional design, then there are good reasons for treating 
morality as not having the same force in its new role as in its old. One 
of the standard objections to paternalism based on prudence and 
rationality is that the paternalist is likely to make mistakes. The agent 
is likely to know best about what will promote his own future 
interests. That remains true whatever the ultimate normative basis of 
our impulse to intervene. Similarly, the shift from prudence to moral- 
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ity does not affect he fact that an agent seems more likely to look out 
for his own future interests than to look out for the interests of 
others. 
I have suggested (and criticized) an argument that the shift from 
prudence to morality strengthens the case for paternalistic inter- 
vention. Let me now suggest an argument for the opposite con- 
clusion. There can be no objection at all, someone might say, to 
interfering with a choice which is irrational. A choice which is 
irrational simply cannot be the fully-deliberated choice of a fully- 
competent agent. But it is only the fully-deliberated choices of 
fully-competent agents that have an intrinsic moral value such that we 
should refuse to interfere with them. An immoral choice, in contrast, 
can be the fully-deliberated choice of a fully-competent agent. It is 
unfortunate, but it is the case, that some agents just choose, in the 
fullest possible sense of "choose," to act immorally. Still, these are 
responsible choices. If the agent harms no one else by his immoral 
choice (and when he harms only himself-in-the-future he harms no one 
else, in Derek's view), we should not interfere. In sum, if Derek has 
shown that the agent who slights his own future interests behaves 
immorally but not irrationally, then he has shown that the inter- 
vention which we thought was justified in fact is not. 
This argument, as it stands, is hardly more satisfying than my first 
argument. It is suggestive, but every premise is highly controversial, 
and some of the premises eem to beg the very question about the 
strength of the justification for paternalism we are trying to answer. 
The upshot is that I do not know how to answer Derek's final 
question on principle. Perhaps we must simply go forward thinking 
about the cases, designing institutions, and generally trying to see 
how strong the reasons for paternalism (and against it) are, without 
worrying too much at this stage about what difference it makes how 
we characterize those reasons. Lest I be misunderstood, I should add 
that I think the general tendency of Derek's argument is clearly to 
strengthen the case for paternalism. I think the Complex View of 
personal identity fits better than the Simple View with the idea that 
we should sometimes intervene to protect an agent against himself. 
It's just that for me Derek's final question is not the natural point of 
entry into an explanation of why that is so. 
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